FROM REVOLUTION TO PURGE

FROM REVOLUTION TO PURGE

Internal divisions and external interests shaping Armenia’s pre-election agenda

Preparation for nationwide elections in Armenia often begins long before the official campaign period. Losing parties work on their "mistakes," while the winners try to deliver at least some of their promises and plan their next moves for the upcoming vote. As election day approaches, interparty negotiations begin, coalitions are formed, candidate lists are refined, and even primaries—once a purely American practice—are becoming fashionable.

Although the pre-election campaign is still far off, as the plebiscite is scheduled for June 2026, the atmosphere in Armenia remains tense. Too much depends on the outcome of this vote.

War or peace?

For the first time in Armenia’s recent political history, a genuine contest is expected between the so-called "party of peace" and the "party of war"—or more precisely, the "party of revenge." Almost immediately after coming to power in 2018, Nikol Pashinyan was labelled a "dove of peace." At that time, the description seemed fitting. Unlike his predecessors—members of the Garabagh Clan and convicted war criminals Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan—Pashinyan was not tainted by bloodshed. His rise to power inspired serious hopes for advancing the peace process. Unfortunately, reality did not meet those expectations.

Once in office, Pashinyan pursued policies far more hawkish than pacific, which led to a new war that Armenia lost. Azerbaijan ended the occupation of its territories and offered peace on its own terms: renunciation of territorial claims, recognition of its territorial integrity, and so forth. Whereas in the 2021 elections Pashinyan had promised to "reclaim Shusha and Hadrut," today, after the counter-terrorist operations and negotiations in Washington, the situation has changed dramatically. The Prime Minister now speaks of the necessity of peace, cooperation, mutual recognition of borders, and the abandonment of territorial ambitions. It is on this platform that he intends to run in the upcoming elections.

Simultaneously with the parliamentary elections, a referendum on a new constitution will also be held. The current constitution explicitly contains territorial claims to Garabagh, and Azerbaijan insists that these clauses must be removed before a peace treaty can be signed. In Yerevan, officials regularly declare that the forthcoming referendum is not a concession to Azerbaijan’s demands but rather Armenia’s own sovereign decision. Much will depend on whether Armenian voters support this decision—especially now, when local revanchists are determined to "take the fight" to Pashinyan, accusing him of being a "traitor" and a "Turkish agent."

There are also indirect signs suggesting that Moscow, too, intends to "take the fight" to Pashinyan, preferring a more compliant figure as Armenia’s Prime Minister.

Chances of the Revanchists

Pashinyan faces a rather motley opposition front, including Dashnaks, remnants of the Garabagh Clan, Serzh Sargsyan’s Republicans, and a host of new parties with ostentatious names such as "I Have Honour" and others. Yet there is no clear leader capable of uniting these factions under a single image or name.

Among the opposition figures, the same Garabagh Clan leaders—Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan—still play a prominent role. The second President of Armenia, Kocharyan, is regarded as Pashinyan’s most dangerous opponent. He is a seasoned political player, known for his lack of scruples, backed by substantial financial resources and strong support from Moscow. With such assets, one might expect no obstacles to his return to power, especially since Kocharyan remains active in public life, giving interviews and holding press conferences.

However, his level of public support remains too low to challenge Pashinyan, who, since the so-called "barbecue revolution," still enjoys broad popularity among the urban lower classes. Moreover, Armenians vividly remember the years of criminal dictatorship under the Garabagh elites—and are unlikely to wish for their return.

Kocharyan may nevertheless continue to act as a "shadow leader," promoting his proxies instead of himself. He even succeeded in getting his son, Levon, elected to parliament. Whether such a strategy can succeed in Armenia’s political climate, however, remains uncertain.

Cleansing the political field

Perhaps for this very reason, Armenia’s opposition is actively searching for a new alternative leader. Until recently, it seemed such a figure had emerged: Vardan Ghukasyan, the mayor of Gyumri, Armenia’s second-largest city. In April this year, he decisively defeated the ruling Civil Contract Party’s candidate in local elections. At his first press conference, he made two high-profile statements: first, calling for Armenia’s accession to the Union State of Russia and Belarus, and second, announcing his intention to run for Prime Minister in the 2026 parliamentary elections.

Yerevan reacted in silence. But soon after, Ghukasyan was arrested on charges of bribery. The details of the investigation remain undisclosed, though it seems the Armenian public is not particularly interested. One can only imagine the uproar from European politicians and human rights defenders if an opposition mayor, let alone a declared parliamentary candidate, were arrested in Azerbaijan. Yet in this case—complete silence. Yerevan faces no criticism for human rights violations, whether for crimes against humanity committed on the occupied Azerbaijani territories or even for the killing of protesters in the streets of Yerevan on March 1, 2008. Against this background, Ghukasyan’s arrest appears to be a mere trifle. Those at 26 Marshal Baghramyan Avenue understand this perfectly—and treat it as a carte blanche. The arrest of the Gyumri mayor is clearly part of Pashinyan’s pre-election purge of the political field.

Once hailed as both a peacemaker and a democrat, the Prime Minister is now accused of using administrative leverage to suppress his opponents, many of whom increasingly find themselves behind bars. And Ghukasyan is not the only one. Also arrested is Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian oligarch and obvious candidate for the role of Armenia’s own Ivanishvili.

Apparently, Moscow, having lost hope for a revival of the Garabagh Clan, had pinned its expectations on implementing a Georgian-style "Ivanishvili scenario" in Armenia. The first candidate for this role seemed to be Ruben Vardanyan. The plan was transparent: return from Russia to Garabagh, revive the separatist project, and then stage a "political march" on Yerevan. But the plan collapsed completely after Azerbaijan’s counter-terrorist operations in September 2023, when the separatist project was dismantled and Vardanyan ended up in a Baku detention centre.

The next candidate was Samvel Karapetyan, the owner of the Tashir Group and Electric Networks of Armenia—but he, too, found himself behind bars, albeit in Yerevan. Pashinyan has also launched an offensive against the hierarchy of the Armenian Church, using both media campaigns and judicial tools. Clearly, the Prime Minister intends to shield himself from surprises ahead of summer 2026. Yet whether his opponents will wait until June, knowing that their chances of victory are slim, remains to be seen.

Back to the nineties?

Much suggests that Pashinyan’s opponents might not wait for the elections. The possibility of a violent scenario in Armenia cannot be ruled out. Robert Kocharyan already has experience with a "creeping coup," and the opposition today can assemble a formidable "armed fist" against Pashinyan—primarily composed of Garabagh natives now settled in Armenia. Attempts are already being made to mobilise veterans of the Second Garabagh War into an anti-Pashinyan strike force.

One vivid example was the act of veterans throwing their medals at the steps of the Defence Ministry—reminiscent of the protests of Vietnam War veterans in the US, though for different reasons. The Armenian veterans’ anger stems from the belief that the government has betrayed their cause and rendered their sacrifice meaningless. Many who fled Garabagh brought weapons with them, further fuelling the threat of instability. Armenia still hosts numerous semi-official armed groups such as "Yerkrapah" and VOMA, and, crucially, the loyalty of the regular armed forces—especially the army—is far from certain.

Pashinyan’s relations with the military have always been uneasy. During his premiership, he repeatedly initiated "military purges," arresting several generals—including Manvel Grigoryan, at whose home crates of canned meat, soldiers’ underwear, an ambulance, and even a funeral wreath were found. Following the 44-day war, the authorities launched a series of trials against military leaders, accusing them of negligence and abandoning positions—effectively shifting responsibility for the defeat onto the army.

These actions have inevitably provoked anger within the military. Pro-Russian sentiment remains strong among Armenia’s officer corps, and with Russian intelligence services still active in the country, the prospect of a military coup cannot be dismissed. If such an event were to occur, the local electoral commission would dutifully "draw" the numbers required for the new regime’s victory.

Such a scenario would pose serious risks to the fragile peace process—and ultimately, it is Armenia itself that would pay the highest price.