PEACE THROUGH GRAIN

On November 8, Azerbaijan marked the fifth anniversary of its Victory in Garabagh. The commemoration was grand and beautiful: a military parade, fireworks, festive concerts, and, of course, memories of what happened during those decisive days five years ago.

Much has already been written. The storming and liberation of Shusha have been recounted in detail: how the assault units climbed the Dashalty cliffs and engaged in near hand-to-hand combat. After this operation, the entire Armenian military grouping concentrated in Garabagh found itself trapped in a deadly "fire cauldron", with no chance of escape. Shusha, the "Crown of Garabagh", is not merely a symbolic peak: it is a dominant height, a crossroads of crucial roads. Securing control over Shusha did not merely shift the situation, it transformed the war into a slaughter. The outcome became inevitable.

And when the smoke of battle had barely cleared from the mountains of Garabagh—both literally and figuratively—Azerbaijan offered its peace agenda. In modern history, it is an unprecedented example: such a rapid transition from war to peace. A chance to build a peaceful future.

Naturally, the initiative did not take effect immediately. The peace process based on Azerbaijan’s roadmap gained full momentum only in August 2025, after the negotiations in Washington that consolidated Azerbaijan’s victory also on the diplomatic front.

Symbolically, just ahead of the fifth anniversary of the Victory, the peace process began working practically, "on the ground". And once again, it was Azerbaijan that initiated it.

A “Grain Corridor” as Azerbaijan sees it

While Baku was preparing for the military parade, an interesting development took place in Armenia. Minister of Economy Gevorg Papoyan personally welcomed a freight train carrying wheat that had passed through Azerbaijani territory and congratulated his compatriots on this event.

A brief historical background first. On October 20–21, President Ilham Aliyev paid a state visit to Kazakhstan. At the joint press conference with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, he announced that Baku had lifted restrictions on the transportation of goods to Armenia. "I must say that Azerbaijan has lifted all restrictions on the transit of goods to Armenia that have existed since the period of occupation, and the first such transit cargo was a shipment of Kazakh grain destined for Armenia. I believe this is also a good indication that peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia exists not only on paper but in practice."

And on November 5, 15 wagons of wheat crossed the Azerbaijani border en route to the Dalarik station in Armenia via the Yalama–Bilajar–Hajigabul–Böyük Kasik route.

In doing so, Baku once again proved its adherence to the peace agenda. The time elapsed between the President’s statement and the start of transit demonstrates that Ilham Aliyev does not make declarations "for the sake of appearances" that later hang unresolved. It is for this reason that Azerbaijan has earned the status of a reliable partner on the international stage, one whose deeds align with its words.

The fine points of food security and transport policy

In ancient times, fertile land was the principal guarantee of survival. Times changed. People settled deserts, mountains, tundra—places seemingly unsuitable for life. This shaped culinary traditions and dietary habits enabling survival in those conditions.

In the modern world, food security does not mean that everything on a family’s table must be grown "at their doorstep". Production, including agriculture, has long been commercial. It is not considered improper to sell oil, electronics, tobacco, tomatoes or fish and purchase not only bananas or avocados but even wheat or milk.

Armenia is among those countries with an acute shortage of arable land due to geography. It must import wheat. Until recently, Armenia relied almost entirely on heavy trucks passing through the "Upper Lars" checkpoint on the Russian–Georgian border. But this route is far from reliable. "Upper Lars" is frequently closed due to natural factors: mudslides, snowfalls and numerous other problems. Moreover, the Military-Georgian Road has limited throughput capacity.

As an alternative, Armenia announced the launch of a ferry between the Russian port of Kavkaz on the Sea of Azov and Georgia’s Poti. But this option is significantly more expensive; and the expression "waiting for the weather at sea" describes the situation perfectly. Finally, the Sea of Azov today is a zone of active hostilities.

Theoretically, wheat could be transported through Azerbaijan. But until recently this remained only a theoretical possibility. During the conflict, Azerbaijan understandably kept its roads to Armenia closed and did not allow the transit of goods to Armenia through its territory via Georgia. Whatever reached Armenia did so through smuggling channels.

Moreover, Armenia regularly encountered scandals when Azerbaijani goods were discovered on local shelves—tomatoes at first, then tea, powdered milk, chocolate sweets, apples… A peculiar record was set with apples: they arrived in boxes labelled "Product of Azerbaijan" with DaD stickers. Experts believed they had been purchased by Georgian traders and later resold to Armenian partners at the famous Sadakhlo market. But such channels were suited only to very minor deals, certainly not to resolving large-scale issues such as food security.

In this context, Azerbaijan’s decision to allow transit to Armenia is almost a "lifeline"—one extended by Baku of its own initiative.

All this happened on the eve of crucial parliamentary elections scheduled in Armenia for June 2026, that is, unless something extraordinary occurs.

Needless to say, the "grain corridor" was unwelcome news for Yerevan’s revanchists. Armenia obtained a tangible benefit from the peace process and at exactly the time when the main problems on the Georgian border typically begin, with winter approaching.

The revanchists nonetheless tried to "spoil the impression". Their more prominent figures chose to remain silent, pushing forward a colourful crowd of "bloggers", "independent experts" and similar commentators. Their arguments were predictable. They interpreted the arrival of the grain shipment on the eve of November 8 as mockery. And they again accused the Prime Minister of "losing Artsakh".

Until autumn 2020 Armenia occupied 20% of Azerbaijani territory, the most fertile agricultural lands. Yerevan failed to fully develop them, of course, but the occupation regime more or less fed itself and even supplied agricultural products, including grain, to Armenia. Now, however, Azerbaijan has liberated its territories with all the ensuing consequences.

How wise, or shortsighted, it was to tie national food security to the occupation of another country’s land is a rhetorical question. Meanwhile, revanchists have called on society to recall the times when, under the din of claims about an "Artsakh blockade", activists blocked the passage of food trucks entering from Azerbaijan. But this appeal has found little support in Armenia today.

Yerevan understood perfectly that Baku’s step could not remain unanswered. Very soon, Nikol Pashinyan declared: "I once again confirm Armenia’s readiness to ensure the transit of goods by road from Margara to Kornidzor and in the reverse direction—from Azerbaijan to Türkiye and from Türkiye to Azerbaijan, starting from today and tomorrow. We are fully ready. If within half an hour a truck arrives at the checkpoint, whether from Kornidzor or from Margara, we are prepared to service it."

Yet this response is far from equivalent. Armenia’s border with Türkiye remains closed. The roads Armenia proposes for transit are mountain passes, closed for much of the year due to weather conditions. And, finally, Armenia has written commitments to ensure transit between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. This was first mentioned in the Trilateral Statement signed on the night of November 10, 2020. According to the initial project, it was envisaged to resume automobile and railway movement along the route known as both the "Meghri" and the "Zangezur Corridor", with its security ensured by Russian border guards. Within days, Moscow declared its readiness to deploy additional posts. But Armenia did absolutely nothing.

Today the agenda concerns the Trump route, also known as TRIPP. Yet even here Yerevan is not demonstrating "Azerbaijani" speed in construction or political decision-making. One way or another, the ball is now on Armenia’s side of the pitch. Baku is therefore fully entitled to expect clearer reciprocal steps from Yerevan.