WASHINGTON TURNS INWARD

One of the most widely discussed developments on the international agenda in recent months has been the adoption of a new US National Security Strategy. As is known, the previous document of this kind was approved under the administration of Joe Biden in 2022, but it has since lost its relevance and is increasingly regarded as a remnant of a bygone era.

It is important to understand that the Biden strategy portrayed the US as the centre of a network of democratic alliances engaged in a prolonged values-based and technological struggle with authoritarian powers, above all China and Russia. Donald Trump, by contrast, views the US as a sovereign power that is no longer obliged to uphold the global order and instead concentrates on controlling its own region, tightly regulating migration policy, de-ideologising relations with China and reassessing the role of allies, especially in Europe, in strictly pragmatic terms. The differences between these documents are therefore not cosmetic but conceptual. They outline two fundamentally different visions of what the US should be within the international system: the architect of a global order or a powerful, yet primarily regional and sovereignty-oriented, actor.

New security approaches

The newly adopted US National Security Strategy has become one of the most illustrative foreign policy documents of recent years. Donald Trump has effectively translated his campaign promises into a legally binding framework that formalises the administration’s priorities in foreign policy, military strategy and domestic governance. Unlike previous strategies focused on global leadership, the maintenance of a liberal international order and an extensive system of alliance commitments, the new version marks a decisive turn towards uncompromising national pragmatism and the principle of “America first”. Priority is given to domestic security, economic resilience and social balance, placing them above the objectives of global governance.

The document proceeds from the assumption that the era of unconditional American patronage over the international system has ended, and that foreign policy must be subordinated to the task of preventing direct threats to the territory, population and economy of the US. For the first time, this logic consistently advances the idea of reallocating resources from distant theatres of military engagement towards the Western Hemisphere, where border protection, migration control, and the fight against transnational crime and drug trafficking acquire the status of core elements of national security. The strategy effectively reinterprets the Monroe Doctrine under modern conditions, emphasising the exceptional importance of Latin America and the Caribbean as zones of vital interest to the US and, at the same time, as arenas of potential competition with external actors.

The foreign policy section of the document reflects a restrained but fundamentally different approach to global centres of power. Competition with China remains a systemic factor, but it is framed primarily in economic, technological and trade terms rather than solely as a military or political confrontation. Emphasis is placed on safeguarding American supply chains, restoring strategic manufacturing, controlling advanced technologies and reducing dependence on external markets. At the same time, the commitment to maintaining military superiority in key regions, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, is preserved and directly linked to Taiwan as a focal point of potential escalation.

Today, American policymakers appear far less concerned with whether China qualifies as an authoritarian state. Washington no longer seeks to instruct Beijing on how it should live or develop. The logic of the current strategy is starkly pragmatic: “Do whatever you want, but not at the expense of our interests.” Not long ago, Joe Biden publicly hinted at the “authoritarian nature” of China’s leadership after meetings with President Xi Jinping, thereby asserting moral superiority. Those times now appear to have passed.

A similar shift is evident in the approach to Russia. The strategy shows a noticeable softening of rhetoric compared with earlier documents. Moscow is no longer positioned as the central global adversary. Strategic rivalry is supplemented by an emphasis on restoring elements of strategic stability and preventing direct military confrontation. In this context, the conflict surrounding Ukraine is viewed primarily through the lens of the need for its swift resolution, as it diverts US resources from domestic priorities and increases the burden of alliance commitments in Europe. For Washington, Russia is no longer framed as an embodiment of “absolute evil”, but increasingly as a compelled partner in addressing certain global challenges. Donald Trump has repeatedly spoken of Vladimir Putin in a respectful tone, often causing open bewilderment and political discomfort among US allies.

Europe no longer a priority

The publication of the new US National Security Strategy became a painful moment of truth for Europe, exposing what for decades had been masked as “transatlantic solidarity” but in essence increasingly resembled strategic dependency. European security was built for many years on a foundation of complacency, with a significant share of defence obligations, intelligence functions, logistics and nuclear deterrence delegated to Washington. Within this framework, Europe became accustomed not to ensuring its own security, but to shaping its security priorities through the resources of others, relying on American military, political and financial support as something guaranteed and inexhaustible.

The new US strategy institutionalises a rejection of this logic. The demand that NATO allies assume a substantially greater share of defence, financial and political responsibility signifies the dismantling of the previous arrangement in which European security functioned as a derivative of American global leadership. European partners are no longer viewed as an unconditional pillar of US strategy, but increasingly as independent actors whose capacity determines the depth and quality of cooperation with Washington. In other words, the formula “we protect, you adapt” is replaced by “you secure yourselves first, then we decide how to engage with you”.

At the same time, the document reflects a critical US assessment of internal socio-political processes within European Union states. Migration policy, identity crises, integration challenges and rising social tensions are interpreted not as the costs of open societies, but as sources of strategic vulnerability that erode state resilience from within. This reinforces Washington’s doubts about Europe’s ability to serve as a reliable and long-term strategic anchor and objectively lays the groundwork for distancing the US from the role of Europe’s principal and unconditional security guarantor.

It is precisely for this reason that the strategy’s publication triggered such a resonant reaction across Europe. A continent long accustomed to strategic complacency suddenly faced the prospect of paying not only for increased defence budgets, but also for dismantling an entire model of strategic comfort. Europe is effectively being asked to settle a historical “bill” accumulated over decades during which security was perceived as an almost free public good, provided by an external actor. This entails not merely higher defence spending, but a comprehensive overhaul of military planning, defence industries, energy resilience and strategic supply chains.

In a broader sense, the new American strategy undermines the very architecture of the former Euro-Atlantic consensus. European states are confronted with a choice between painful autonomy, attempts to preserve residual patronage through political concessions, or a transition to a fragmented security system in which each seeks individual guarantees. Thus ends the era in which Europe could afford the luxury of strategic dependency while claiming geopolitical agency. In the new reality, complacency transforms from a comfortable condition into a systemic vulnerability, and reliance on others for security becomes a direct source of political risk.

Domestic and economic factors in national security

It is also significant that internal security is elevated in the new strategy to a level equal to external threats. Migration, demographic dynamics, cultural resilience, border protection and control over internal flows are defined as existential components of national security. The document asserts that the erosion of social and identity foundations undermines a state’s capacity for long-term resource mobilisation and is therefore directly linked to defence capability and economic competitiveness. In this context, strengthened border control, a tough anti-migration policy and the fight against transnational criminal networks are embedded in a broader logic of protecting the internal space of the US from destabilising external and internal factors.

It is telling that during Donald Trump’s first presidential term, the southern border with Mexico was already viewed as a key line of internal security. The emphasis was placed on physically blocking flows, building a wall, tightening migration procedures and applying force against illegal routes. Under current conditions, this issue has gained renewed urgency. America will no longer be a haven for international criminal networks, at least as it is formulated in the White House. The image of the resolute ranger once embodied on screen by Chuck Norris appears to be returning to fashion.

The economic dimension of the strategy occupies a special place and is directly linked to the category of national security. The document formalises a rejection of the previous model of global economic interdependence as an unconditional good and transitions towards a concept of controlled economic openness. Critical sectors come to the fore, including energy, microelectronics, military technologies, logistics and rare earth processing. The strategy envisages active use of tariff, investment and sanctions instruments to protect the American market and stimulate re-industrialisation. As a result, economic policy is firmly established as an extension of security policy and becomes an element of long-term geo-economic competition.

Overall, the new National Security Strategy marks the US departure from its former role as a “global judge” and universal guarantor of world order. Washington no longer seeks to determine which country is “sufficiently democratic” or where forceful intervention is allegedly required in the name of abstract values. The US is stepping away from ideological pressure and ceasing to treat interference in the internal affairs of other states as a normal instrument of foreign policy. This breaks the logic of American political messianism that for years served to justify interventions, sanctions and managed crises.

Objectively, this reduces the legitimacy of imposing political models by force. Under the new conditions, other states gain a genuine opportunity to build relations with the US on a more pragmatic and equal footing, free from value-based diktat, ideological blackmail and the constant threat of intervention under seemingly noble pretexts.