DIVISION CANCELLED?

Recently, the situation surrounding American claims to Greenland has changed. This issue has evolved beyond the standard critical discourse between the US and its European NATO allies, becoming part of the broader context of Washington's trade, political and military-strategic contradictions with Europe. Recent developments suggest that this issue is no longer up for discussion. Instead, we are seeing the emergence of divisions that are significantly affecting the potential for transatlantic cooperation as a whole.

Tariffs as a pretext

A key element of this new dynamic has been Washington's attempt to use tariff instruments as a means of political pressure. Threats to impose additional duties on Denmark and a number of European Union countries, including France and Germany, were directly linked to their position on the Arctic agenda and security issues affecting Greenland. In this way, US trade policy was once again aligned with geostrategic goals. This approach aligns with the prevailing logic of Donald Trump's foreign policy strategy, which has been characterised by the utilisation of economic leverage as a primary bargaining tool.

In response, the European side has indicated its intention to take retaliatory measures, including the possibility of introducing counter-tariffs. Such an escalation would have created the risk of an emergency situation within the transatlantic bloc, affecting not only the trade and economic sphere, but also the foundations of political coordination between allies.

This line of thinking was further developed on 22 January, when an emergency discussion was held in Brussels at the level of EU institutions and heads of state and government on the situation that had arisen, focusing on potential US trade and political steps against its European allies.

The results of the EU summit on 22 January demonstrated that it would be ill-advised to consider a sudden shift in the European Union's relationship with the US towards confrontation. There is a growing concern in Brussels that Washington is increasingly linking trade measures to security issues and the Arctic agenda. However, there is currently no consensus within the EU on a robust response. Many countries are concerned that an open trade war with the US could have negative consequences for the EU economy and could potentially undermine transatlantic cooperation, especially given Europe's ongoing reliance on the US for security.

Specifically, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has stated that the European Union should avoid confrontation with US President Donald Trump, as this could have negative consequences for European countries.

With regard to Greenland, the EU's position was to support Denmark's sovereignty and to refuse to recognise pressure on allies through economic instruments. At the same time, the European Union deliberately chose not to use the issue of Greenland as a reason for imposing sanctions or trade retaliation. The EU's position on Arctic matters is that they should be addressed in multilateral and institutional formats, as opposed to bilateral negotiations.

Critics of this approach accused the EU leadership of indecisiveness and toothlessness. The summit has been described by some as yet another "talking shop".

The EU has limited tools with which to counter the American line of conduct. Possible sanctions against the US could have unintended consequences for Brussels, which may take some time to recover from.

As NATO Secretary General and former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte later described the situation, Europe is unable to ensure its own security without the participation of the United States. "Those who believe that the EU or Europe as a whole can defend itself without the US are misguided. Unfortunately, this is not possible. Unfortunately, this is not possible. We are interdependent. The US requires NATO's support. It is imperative that we establish a secure Arctic region, ensure security in the Atlantic Ocean and maintain security in Europe," he said.

What about a solution?

The timing of the resolution of these issues, which were discussed during Trump's meeting with Rutte on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum, is noteworthy. The most optimal solution to the existing contradictions was found after critical issues related to the risks of a split within the Alliance were discussed. Consequently, on the eve of the emergency EU summit, the head of the American administration made a statement about temporarily abandoning the implementation of tariff threats. This was presented as the result of reaching a "framework for a future agreement" on Greenland and the Arctic region as a whole. This shift indicates a strategic realignment within the US's foreign policy, moving from a focus on exerting pressure to a more measured approach of achieving specific objectives.

The timing of the negotiations with Rutte was opportune. Speaking on behalf of the bloc, the NATO Secretary General proposed a compromise formula that allowed both sides to save face. The agreements reached emphasise the pivotal role of the US military presence in Greenland, including existing bases, in ensuring the stability of the region. This primarily concerns the Pitutfik (Thule) space base, which is regarded as a key stronghold for early warning, missile defence and control of the North Atlantic and Arctic regions.

The European side has de facto agreed that the further development of this infrastructure, as well as the possible modernisation and expansion of the functions of US facilities in the Arctic, will take place within the framework of NATO and under the leadership and coordination of the US. This includes the following measures: strengthening surveillance systems, radar control, logistical support and operational compatibility of allied forces in northern latitudes.

The focus is not on establishing new national bases for European countries, but rather on integrating their capabilities around existing American facilities. This approach enables Washington to maintain its central role in the Arctic deterrence architecture and allows the EU to circumvent direct political confrontation by formally aligning its actions with the principles of collective security.

For Rutte and the European countries, the compromise reached was a means of buying time and avoiding an immediate split. The rejection of tariffs has reduced tensions, maintained channels of dialogue and averted an institutional crisis within NATO. At the same time, the Europeans have not abandoned their own long-term interests in the Arctic. They have merely agreed to discuss them within a framework more strictly defined by the Americans.

However, the real outcome of these agreements will depend on whether Washington can turn a temporary compromise into a sustainable system of commitments, and whether Europe can defend its room for manoeuvre without entering into open confrontation.

The Arctic at stake

In addition to security issues, the agreements also covered the subject of mineral resources, focusing primarily on Greenland. The European side has effectively agreed that the development of these resources will take place in close coordination with Washington and will be linked to the overall security system.

It is evident that the US will assume a dominant role in the region, not only in terms of military presence, but also in determining the regulations governing access to strategically significant resources, including rare earth elements and other critical materials. For the EU, this approach reduces its dependence on alternative suppliers, primarily China, but at the same time limits its ability to pursue an independent resource policy in the Arctic.

Overall, developments around Greenland and the Arctic have demonstrated that, despite the use of harsh rhetoric and elements of pressure, neither the United States nor the European Union is interested in reaching a permanent institutional rupture. It is evident that the actions of the parties involved demonstrate a commitment to maintaining the manageability of existing contradictions and averting their escalation into a systemic crisis in transatlantic relations.

Washington's decision to pursue an open split with Europe would be strategically disadvantageous for several reasons. Firstly, the implementation of the American Arctic strategy relies heavily on allied infrastructure, the political legitimacy of NATO, and the participation of European partners in ensuring northern security. Secondly, in the context of competition with China and the ongoing confrontation with Russia, it is in the US's best interests to consolidate Euro-Atlantic cooperation, rather than fragmenting the alliance. This explains the refusal to immediately apply tariff measures and the shift from a tactic of tough pressure to a format of limited compromise, allowing American leadership to be established without destroying allied mechanisms.

The EU has also demonstrated its unwillingness to break ties. Despite growing dissatisfaction with attempts to politicise trade and impose decisions on sensitive security issues, Brussels believes that Europe does not yet have a full-fledged alternative to the American alliance in the military and strategic spheres. It is evident that the country's reliance on the US for defence, nuclear deterrence, intelligence and operational planning restricts the likelihood of a severe military confrontation. Consequently, the European line was built around the idea of depoliticising the Greenland issue, preserving multilateral formats and buying time, rather than around an immediate military or trade response.

Therefore, the compromise that has been reached reflects the mutual understanding of the parties involved that, at this stage, it would be unadvisable for them to be separated without incurring significant costs. In this sense, it appears that the current agreements are not a final settlement, but a provisional arrangement that allows for the deferral of challenging decisions and the maintenance of stable relations.

This is precisely why Greenland is not becoming a point of rupture between the US and Europe, but rather an arena for complex bargaining, in which the parties are simultaneously competing and forced to cooperate. Neither Washington nor Brussels is prepared to address the accumulated contradictions in a way that would lead to an open split. Instead, both prefer to maintain a degree of interdependence, albeit in a more discreet form.