RADICAL RESTRUCTURING

The global media landscape was rocked in late January 2026 by the news that two of China's most senior military figures have become the subjects of disciplinary investigations for "serious violations of discipline and law". The officers in question are General Zhang Youxia, the previously "untouchable" Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC)—the supreme governing body of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)—and General Liu Zhenli, the Chief of the PLA Joint Staff Department.

This particular euphemism, a staple of official Chinese government communications, typically serves as a precursor to an inevitable dismissal and, in many instances, a prison sentence. In an editorial published on January 25, 2026, the Jiefangjun Bao—the official mouthpiece of the PLA—asserted that Zhang and Liu had "betrayed the trust of the party and the people" and "compromised the principle of the party's absolute leadership over the armed forces".

Culmination of the restructuring

The Central Military Commission is the highest collegial body responsible for the management of China's armed forces, which include the People's Liberation Army, the Strategic Rocket Force (responsible for the nuclear triad), the Strategic Support Force, and the People's Armed Police. It is important to note that the Chairman of the CMC, rather than the President of China in a general sense, formally acts as the Commander-in-Chief. This pivotal role is held by Xi Jinping, who holds the concurrent positions of President of China, Chairman of the CMC, and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC).

The ousting of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli is merely the peak of a comprehensive personnel overhaul that was initiated several years ago. Of the six CMC members originally appointed by Xi Jinping in 2022, only one remained in office by the start of 2026: General Zhang Shengmin, who is responsible for political work and discipline. Over the past three years, of the at least 30 generals and admirals who commanded various service branches and theatres of operation, a mere seven have managed to retain their posts. This follows the dismissal of the second-ranking CMC Vice Chairman, He Weidong, in October 2025, who was also removed under the cloud of corruption allegations.

What has compelled the Chinese leader to execute such a vast purge of his military ranks? While Beijing’s official narrative focuses on the necessity of rooting out corruption, Western and Russian analysts have offered a variety of alternative theories, ranging from internal elite power struggles to fundamental disagreements over strategic priorities, including the military doctrine and the approach to Taiwan.

Notably, Zhang Youxia disappeared from public view several weeks prior to the official announcement. This sequence—the sudden disappearance of a figure followed by a formal announcement of an investigation—has now become a standard operating procedure. Western media have observed that these developments are reminiscent of the Mao Zedong era, particularly the decade-long Cultural Revolution, when numerous high-ranking generals were stripped of power to both neutralise potential political rivals and ensure total adherence to revolutionary ideology.

Many Western experts interpret Xi Jinping’s latest moves as a sign of personal friction and anxiety regarding possible dissent within the PLA. They point to his clear intent to consolidate power by dismantling any potential centres of influence that fall outside his direct oversight. Military circles, especially the "princelings"—the descendants of revolutionary veterans, a group that includes Zhang Youxia—have historically operated as a distinct caste with their own proprietary channels of influence. Consequently, his dismissal is a symbolic declaration of the military's final subordination to the party vertical commanded by Xi Jinping.

Simultaneously, some observers have connected the Chinese leader’s actions to perceived failures in the army's modernisation efforts. There are reports of a deepening rift between Xi Jinping and his top brass regarding the expected timeline for military upgrades. According to the Wall Street Journal, Xi has been adamant that the military reach full combat readiness by 2027, whereas General Zhang Youxia maintained that 2035 was a more achievable and realistic deadline.

Current modernisation phases for the PLA are thought to include the implementation of a fully digital command-and-control system and the rollout of quantum technologies for nuclear command. China is actively constructing a military tailored for high-tech warfare, where networks, electronics, and sophisticated management are paramount. To realise these expansive ambitions, Xi requires unquestioning executors rather than old-school generals who remain wedded to traditional doctrines.

Taiwan harbinger?

According to another theory, which is more widely held in the West, these purges could indicate a transition toward an open confrontation with the US in the Indo-Pacific region. The sheer scale of Xi Jinping's recent decisions highlights the systemic nature of the overhaul: investigations have touched every branch of the military—from the Strategic Rocket Force to the Navy—including the leadership of all five military commands, most notably the Eastern Theatre Command, which is tasked with operations in the Taiwan Strait.

The year 2027 has been repeatedly mentioned as a critical date for a potential military resolution to the Taiwan issue; the date carries heavy symbolism as the centenary of the PLA's founding and coincides with the next CPC Congress, where Xi Jinping may be confirmed for a historic fourth term. Many analysts argue that the risk of a military conflict between the US and China over Taiwan has risen markedly over the last two years. Underlining this readiness, the PLA conducted major military exercises in the waters surrounding Taiwan in late December 2025, showcasing its ability to enforce both naval and aerial blockades.

In this context, Western analysts view the 75-year-old Zhang Youxia not just as a seasoned commander—having served in the ground forces and being one of the few PLA leaders with genuine combat experience—but also as a restraining voice of caution within the military establishment. The removal of such figures may mean that no one is left with the seniority or courage to advise Xi Jinping against pursuing a military solution for Taiwan. The Wall Street Journal notes that by centralising all power, Xi Jinping has become the exclusive decision-making authority, which significantly broadens his options for a potential invasion of the island.

Nevertheless, Western experts caution that these personnel purges are not, in isolation, a definitive sign of an imminent invasion. They do, however, demand a more rigorous monitoring of PLA leadership changes as a primary indicator of China's readiness for an escalation in the Taiwan Strait. Concurrently, there is the question of whether the removal of conservative generals will truly expedite modernisation and increase the army's effectiveness in a hypothetical Taiwan operation.

Some theories suggest that, in the immediate future, Beijing may favour a strategy of "multi-layered coercion" over a full-scale invasion: this would involve simulated blockades through massive exercises, cyber warfare, information operations, and economic pressure—all designed to erode Taiwan’s resistance gradually without resorting to open warfare. The US, acting as the island’s chief benefactor and provider of essential military support, continues to oppose any forced unification of Taiwan with China. They regard the island as vital for the protection of US interests in the Indo-Pacific.

Curiously, as reported by the Wall Street Journal, Zhang Youxia is also allegedly being investigated for the leakage of state secrets to the US, specifically regarding the details of China’s nuclear weapons programme.

Economic challenges and regional security

On the other hand, such sweeping purges inevitably create a leadership vacuum within the military. This is compounded by the ongoing economic crisis, which places additional strain on Xi Jinping. The Chinese economy is currently grappling with several structural hurdles: a slowdown in growth, declining credit activity, a persistent real estate crisis, and weak domestic demand. Official figures suggest that China's GDP grew by 5% in 2025, meeting the government's target.

However, independent economists argue that this growth was largely the result of significant fiscal intervention, while the underlying economic indicators remain fragile. Projections for 2026 and 2027 indicate a further deceleration. Another major constraint is the trade friction with the US; the return of the second Trump administration brings the threat of new tariffs and intensified technological restrictions.

In this environment, Beijing is exploring ways to break the stalemate and is reportedly drafting a plan for a radical restructuring of the economy's mobilisation base and the financial system—moving toward a model designed for national security during a period of prolonged global confrontation. However, an outright confrontation with China is also not in the interests of the American president. In this specific arena of his unpredictable and assertive foreign policy, he may choose to exhibit pragmatism and a willingness to negotiate deals.

It is possible that Xi Jinping also seeks a fundamental agreement with the US president on the many issues that concern both Beijing and Washington; for such high-stakes negotiations, he requires an absolute concentration of power, free from "unnecessary voices" in the military. For China's neighbours—Japan, India, and South Korea—these personnel shifts in Beijing carry direct implications for their own security. Tokyo has long viewed China’s military expansion as its primary strategic threat and is closely watching any shifts in the PLA's planning structure. Indian experts are viewing these events through the prism of the ongoing Himalayan border dispute. Meanwhile, Seoul is concerned that leadership instability could result in unpredictable PLA behaviour in the Yellow Sea and increase pressure regarding sanctions on Pyongyang and the hosting of US missile defence systems.

Interestingly, Russia has maintained a restrained reaction to these events, despite General Zhang Youxia’s vital role in strengthening military ties between Moscow and Beijing. Nevertheless, the Russian leadership likely fears that instability in the PLA's upper echelons could complicate coordination within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and hinder the progress of joint arms projects and military exercises.

Ultimately, the current upheaval among China’s military elite signifies more than a mere reshuffle. It represents a radical restructuring of the command system governing the world's largest army. While this reduces the risk of competing power centres, it also makes the system more brittle: with such high power concentration, any internal friction could lead to far more severe consequences.

For the global balance of power, these events mark the beginning of a period of heightened uncertainty. Under Xi's guidance, China is becoming increasingly ambitious in its geopolitical goals—from the Belt and Road Initiative to a harder stance in the East and South China Seas and toward Taiwan. Therefore, the current situation in Beijing is far more than a domestic affair; it is a pivotal factor that will shape global politics for years to come. This unprecedented purge in the military of the Celestial Empire is not a conclusion; rather, it is the prologue to a drama whose finale is yet to be written.