POLITICS INSTEAD OF LAW

On April 16, 2024, the lower houses of the Dutch and Belgian parliaments adopted synchronised decisions. In the Netherlands, MP Don Ceder of the Christian Union party presented two motions: one concerning the release of individuals described as Armenian prisoners of war in Azerbaijan, and another regarding the recognition of the Armenian genocide. At the same time, in Belgium, MP Michel de Maegd presented a resolution that reflected the broader Armenian agenda. This document calls for the following measures to be implemented:

The right of Garabagh residents to return under international guarantees.

The establishment of a monitoring mechanism.

The withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces to their positions as of May 12, 2021.

The resolution of the status of persons detained in Baku.

It is important to note that these steps are not merely foreign policy signals; they reflect a significant discrepancy between the actual dynamics on the ground in the South Caucasus and the political interpretations originating from abroad.

From a formal standpoint, these actions represent standard parliamentary procedure. However, at their core, these measures are symbolic political manoeuvres intended less to find viable solutions and more to cater to the interests of specific influence groups. In response, Azerbaijan has submitted a formal diplomatic protest to both Belgium and the Netherlands regarding these parliamentary documents, which it characterises as inherently anti-Azerbaijani.

In the context of a gradual normalisation of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, these initiatives appear to be an attempt to shift the agenda back to a state of confrontation. It is evident that they are disregarding the fundamental legal and demographic realities that have emerged since the conclusion of the conflict's active phase.

What is real and what is fake?

A central tenet of these European resolutions is the right of return for the Armenian population of Garabagh, whom they do not refer to as refugees. Meanwhile, these parliamentarians seem unwilling to acknowledge the right of return for the 300,000 Azerbaijani refugees whose status has been officially recognised by the international community.

International law does indeed protect the right of return, but this is applicable only to refugees who fulfil specific criteria. In particular, the right applies to individuals who hold citizenship or a stable legal connection to a territory. In the case of Garabagh, which lies within the internationally recognised borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the ethnic Armenians who departed the region in 2023 do not fall into this category. The individuals concerned are foreign nationals, primarily citizens of the Republic of Armenia, or those who were resettled in the occupied territories following the onset of the conflict.

It is crucial to pay particular attention to the composition of the population mentioned in these European initiatives. The market is not homogeneous and comprises several distinct categories:

1) Individuals who resided in the Garabagh region prior to the commencement of hostilities in 1988.

2) Individuals who relocated to Garabagh during the conflict for the purpose of participating in militant activities and occupying Azerbaijani territories, subsequently opting to remain there and establish families.

3) Individuals who were permanently resettled in Garabagh following the initial Garabagh war of 1992–1994.

4) Individuals who remained in Garabagh as members of the Armenian Republic's armed forces or other illegal militant formations.

It is important to note that combining these categories into a single image of the Garabagh population is not an accurate representation of the truth. Within the context of potential integration, it is only the first group that can be considered. The remaining parties have been linked to either illegal settlement or armed activities.

Consequently, the thesis of a mass return in its proposed form lacks both a legal and factual foundation.

Ignoring this distinction transforms a legal matter into a political slogan. In effect, what is being proposed is not the restoration of rights, but the creation of a new precedent where foreign citizens are granted residency rights outside the framework of a sovereign state’s national legislation.

Sovereignty and the limits of external interference

The second set of demands—the release of alleged Armenian captives—is equally telling. These demands refer to individuals who have been convicted by Azerbaijani courts for specific criminal offences.

A clear distinction must be made here: Azerbaijan does not conduct detentions based on ethnicity. Those currently facing the judicial system are accused of war crimes, including the killing of civilians, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, involvement in sabotage, and acts of terrorism.

Under international law, such actions are classified as grave crimes, subject to the principle of the inevitability of punishment. This principle is enshrined in various international norms, including the UN Charter and the established practice of international tribunals.

Attempts to frame these individuals as "captives" or "victims" effectively substitute legal classification with political rhetoric. Furthermore, demands for their release constitute direct interference in the judicial system of a sovereign state.

This raises a logical question: to what extent do such appeals align with the very European principles of the rule of law and judicial independence that the sponsors of these resolutions so frequently cite?

A precedent of impunity, or legal fixation

The judicial proceedings in Baku carry a significance far broader than the adjudication of individual cases. They have established a legal and judicial assessment of the conflict, dismantling one of its core elements—the sense of impunity.

For decades, the South Caucasus remained a space where many crimes effectively escaped legal scrutiny. In this sense, the Baku trials represent a transition from political interpretations to the legal documentation of facts and personal accountability.

This is precisely why they have attracted such intense external pressure. The acknowledgement of individual guilt has disrupted a narrative convenient for political lobbying, in which the conflict is presented solely through the lens of one side’s collective suffering.

Politics instead of law

The April decisions by the Dutch and Belgian parliaments demonstrate not so much an independent political line as the result of coordinated external influence. The synchronicity of these steps points to their origin: a long-established network of the Armenian lobby, capable of advancing a specific agenda across several European capitals simultaneously.

In this construct, Azerbaijan is cast as a convenient opponent—geographically distant and culturally distinct—which simplifies the creation of a one-sided narrative. The politicians involved in this process do not act situationally; they act consistently, building their own political profiles around this theme.

In both the Netherlands and Belgium, the primary initiators of such documents have maintained a steady line for decades, ignoring alternative perspectives. Their activity is difficult to explain solely through ideological conviction; it aligns seamlessly with the logic of lobbyist support and electoral calculations.

The timing of these April resolutions is also no coincidence. The efforts of figures such as Don Ceder and Michel de Magd fit into a wider system of lobbyist influence, where phrasing and agendas are often reproduced almost verbatim across different nations.

An additional factor is religious identity. In certain European political circles, Armenia is perceived through a lens of civilisational proximity, which fosters an inherently asymmetrical view of the conflict. Such an approach oversimplifies a complex reality and replaces rigorous analysis with emotionally charged clichés.

Meanwhile, a significant portion of history related to the long-standing conflict and its humanitarian consequences remains overlooked. European documents display a selective interpretation of rights and security, which undermines their claim to objectivity.

In this context, questions inevitably arise regarding the moral standing of the European states themselves. High-profile corruption cases in recent years within European parliamentarianism have exposed systemic vulnerabilities and the reliance of certain politicians on external funding. This erodes trust in the decisions being made and necessitates viewing them through the prism of potential lobbyist influence.

Furthermore, the position of Armenia itself is being ignored. In recent years, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has demonstrated a far more restrained and pragmatic approach than the demands being pushed through European parliaments.

As Azerbaijan and Armenia move toward a settlement and the formation of a new architecture for their relations, external players continue to operate using outdated schemes.

A paradox emerges: external actors are proving to be more radical than the direct participants in the conflict.

The limits of the permissible

The primary issue with the April initiatives is their lack of alignment with legal reality. It is important to note that they disregard three fundamental principles: The sovereignty of a state in matters of justice, the distinction between a civilian population and war criminals, and the fact that foreign citizens do not possess an automatic right of residence in another country are the three main points to consider.

Consequently, such resolutions are perceived not as instruments for a settlement, but as elements of political expediency. Meanwhile, the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia is developing not in the parliamentary halls of Europe, but through direct dialogue between the two nations.

As this process progresses, the secondary nature of these resolutions will become increasingly evident. While these declarations may generate international attention, they cannot alter the fundamental fact that neither the question of citizenship nor the question of criminal liability is settled by political declarations. These matters are resolved within the framework of the law.